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N-Person Discrete-Time Dynamic Games of Asymmetric Information
Linan Huang1 and Quanyan Zhu2
Abstract—This paper considers a class of N-person discrete-
time dynamic games with an asymmetric information structure.
Each player has private information revealed only to himself,
which is modeled as a random variable called the type. Each
player aims to find an optimal feedback control policy to reach
the desired state while minimizing the control cost without
exact knowledge of the system dynamics. Players can form
a belief on the unknowns based on the observation of the
state trajectory and update it via the Bayesian rule to learn
the type value of other players. To deal with the uncertainty
caused by the private information, each player forms his control
policy under the expectation of the type belief, which forms the
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). The strong coupling
of the type estimation and the control policy establishes no
separation principle in our non-classical information structure.
In particular, we investigate the linear-quadratic setting, and
we obtain generalized Riccati equations and an affine state-
feedback PBNE policy. Moreover, we show that the PBNE policy
is unique if it exists and is strongly time consistent. Finally,
we numerically illustrate the proposed framework with a case
study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic game theory models the long-term interactions
of multiple strategic decision makers. It has a broad appli-
cation in security and privacy of cyber-physical systems [1],
industrial and environmental economics [2], the protection
of large-scale interdependent infrastructures [3], and the
collective opinion formulation of multiagent systems [4]. In
many practical applications such as the auctions design [5]
and cyber deception [6], each player has his own private
information unknown to the other players which creates
information asymmetry among the players. In the auction,
the bidder has a private evaluation of the good regardless of
his bid. In the cyber deception games, the defender may not
know whether the current user is legitimate or not due to the
stealthy and the deceptive feature of the attacks [7].
In this work, we consider an N-player dynamic game with
the shared state dynamics described by a linear state-space
model driven by a sequence of additive noise with a known
distribution. Each player has his private information that can
influence the state dynamics and thus the cost functions of
all the players.
Following the Harsanyi’s approach [8], we use a random
variable, known as the private type or the attribute of the
player, to model the piece of information that one player
knows but the other players do not. The distribution of the
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type is commonly known but its realization is only known to
the player himself. The information structure of each player’s
feedback control policy consists of the private knowledge
of his own type and the observation of the common state
variable. This kind of information structure is non-classical
[9] where one player’s control action will affect the state
transition, thus the information structure of other players at
the next stage. The existence of the additive noise sequence
makes it impossible for the other players to infer the exact
value of that player’s control, and further his private type.
Similar to the Witsenhausen’s counterexample where the
information of the second controller depends on the decisions
of the first controller, and all the variations [10] on the
non-classical information structure, the multi-agent control
problem in our work also couples with the estimation of the
private types.
This formulation a` la Harsanyi with a ‘hidden type’
leads to a class of dynamic Bayesian games of asymmetric
information and is applicable to cooperative scenarios, such
as a distributed control of multi-agent systems with a limited
information sharing due to communication constraints or
privacy issues, uncooperative scenarios, such as each player
aims to track a different reference signal, and competitive
scenarios, such as in the pursuit and evasion games where
the pursuers do not know the exact system dynamics of the
evaders and vice versa.
However, there lacks methods to solve this class of dy-
namic game where the hidden types or private information
in lieu of the imperfect monitoring of the state introduce the
incomplete information. In addition, there are two kinds of
uncertainties in the system, i.e., the external system noise and
the internal ‘type’ uncertainties. The additive system noise
hides player’s type, making it harder for the players to map
out the types of the other players and the associated system
dynamics. On the other hand, as the private information
of the players jointly affects their payoff and the state
dynamics, each strategic player learns the true type through
state observations and determine the control. To this end, we
set up a Bayesian learning framework where each player
forms a belief in the others’ type and updates his belief
according to the arriving observation at each stage.
Each player aims to optimize his own expected cost and
leads to the solution concept of the perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (PBNE) where no players can benefit from uni-
lateral deviation at each stage. We use dynamic programming
to compute the PBNE backwardly and obtain generalized
Riccati equations coupled linearly with the belief dynamics.
Once exists, the PBNE control policy is unique and takes
the form of an affine state-feedback control. Moreover, the
PBNE policy is subgame perfect, thus robust to mistakes and
uncertainties at each stage. We characterize the structure of
the equilibrium policy and the necessary conditions for the
existence of solutions.
From the case study, we show that the belief dynamics
converges to the true types. The convergence rate depends on
the system parameters under different types. The results on
the PBNE control and the state tracking show that the players
can track a sinusoidal signal under the PBNE. We observe
that a more capable player spends more control efforts and a
higher cost in the distributed cooperation with local private
information.
The system model considered in this work has a connec-
tion with Markov jump systems under incomplete informa-
tion of the mode [11], in which the system switches among
different operation modes and the controller cannot observe
the mode directly. The coupling of the estimation and the
control in our framework also aligned well with a class of
bandit-arm type of problems where there exists a tradeoff
between exploration and exploitation [12].
A. Notations
Throughout the paper, we use calligraphic letter X to
define the set, Pr for probability, E for expectation, and Tr
for the trace of the matrix. Denote I as the identity matrix
of a proper dimension and the matrix transpose as ′. The
superscript k is the stage index and the subscript i is the
player index. There are N players and K stages where player
Pi has Ni possible type realizations. The control policy µ
k
i
and the belief lki are mappings while the control value u
k
i and
the belief state l¯ki are the outcome of the mapping.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the state dynamics and the Bayesian belief update.
The analysis of the linear quadratic setting is introduced
in Section III to obtain the PBNE policy as well as the
generalized Riccati equations. In Section IV, a case study
of a scalar system is presented and Section V concludes the
paper.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The proposed dynamic game consists a set N :=
{1,2, · · · ,N} of N players. To model the private information,
we introduce a discrete random variable θˆi as the type of
each player Pi, i ∈ N . The type value θi is the realization
of the random variable θˆi and is private information of Pi.
Thus, each player Pl does not know other players’ type
θ−l := {θ j} j 6=l, j,l∈N , where θi ∈ Θi := {θ
1
i ,θ
2
i , · · · ,θ
Ni
i } ⊆
R
Ni . Each player Pi has an initial belief of the others’ type,
i.e., the prior distribution l¯0i of θˆ−i is commonly known.
A. Stochastic State Dynamics
We consider the following state dynamics in (1) with an
n−dimensional system state xk ∈X ⊆Rn at stage k ∈K :=
{0,1, · · · ,K} and mi-dimensional control inputs u
k
i ∈ Ui ⊆
R
mi for each player i.
xk+1 = f (xk,uk1, · · · ,u
k
N ,θ )+w
k
. (1)
The joint type θ := {θ1,θ2, · · · ,θN} ∈∏
N
i=1Θi of all players
and the additive noise sequence wk ∈ Rn (not necessarily
Gaussian) affect the system dynamics. For simplicity, we
assume the noise sequence to be independent E(w j(wi)′) =
0,∀i 6= j, i, j ∈K , with a zeros mean E(wk) = 0 and a co-
variance matrix E(wk(wk)′) = Qk,∀k ∈ K . At each stage
k, the information available to player Pi consists the full
state history hk := {x0, · · · ,xk} as well as his own type
value θi. Thus, the control value u
k
i should be a outcome
of the control policy µki (h
k,θi) under the given information
structure {hk,θi}. As we will later show in Theorem 1, with
the Markov belief update in (2), the control policy µ¯ki (x
k
,θi)
is Markov with respect to the state.
B. Forward Belief Update
Each player i at time k forms a Markov belief lki :
X × Θi → △Θ−i, where △Θ−i is the distribution over
Θ−i :=∏ j∈{N \i}Θ j, the joint type space of all other players.
Thus, lki (·|x
k,θi) is a conditional probability measure of the
other players’ types, i.e., ∑θ−i∈Θ−i l
k
i (θ−i|x
k,θi) = 1,∀x
k,θi.
Then the new arrival of state observations xk+1 leads to the
following Bayesian update:
Pr(θ−i|h
k+1
,θi) =
Pr(θ−i|h
k,θi)Pr(x
k+1|θ−i,h
k,θi)
∑θ−i Pr(x
k+1|θ−i,hk,θi)Pr(θ−i|hk,θi)
.
Because of Pr(xk+1|θ−i,h
k,θi) = Pr(x
k+1|θ−i,x
k,θi) and the
Markov assumption of the belief, i.e., Pr(θ−i|h
k
,θi) =
Pr(θ−i|x
k,θi), Pi can update his belief of others’ types via
lk+1i (θ−i|x
k+1
,θi)
=
Pr(xk+1|θ−i,x
k
,θi)l
k
i (θ−i|x
k
,θi)
∑θ−i Pr(x
k+1|θ−i,xk,θi)l
k
i (θ−i|x
k,θi)
.
(2)
With a known probability density function dwk
of the noise wk, Pr(xk+1|θ−i,x
k,θi) = dwk(x
k+1 −
f (xk,µ∗,k1 (h
k,θ1), · · · ,µ
∗k
N (h
k,θN),θ )), where µ
∗,k
i is
the PBNE policy of player i in Definition 1. Note that
player i can compute the equilibrium policy µ∗,ki ,∀i ∈ N ,
yet cannot observe the control value uk−i of other players
directly. Define the outcome of the belief mapping lki as
l¯ki ∈△Θ−i. We embed the belief in the optimization problem
as a state by taking expectation of the random variable θˆ−i
with respect to l¯ki .
C. Nonzero-Sum Cost and PBNE
At stage k, player i’s cost function is gki : X ×∏
N
i=1Ui×
Θi→R and his final stage cost is g
K
i :X ×Θi→R. Let J
k0
i :
∏Kk=k0 X ×∏
K−1
k=k0
∏Ni=1Ui×Θi→R be the expected cost-to-
go function of player i from stage k0 to the terminal stage
K. Each player Pi aims to determine his control value u
k
i at
each stage k= k0,k0+1, · · · ,K−1, to minimize a long-term
expected cost in the following form with uk := {uki }i∈N ∈
∏Ni=1Ui.
J
k0
i (u
k0 ,uk0+1, · · · ,uK−1,xk0 ,θi) =
Eθˆ−i∼l¯ki
[gKi (x
K
,θi)+
K−1
∑
k=k0
Ewk∼d
wk
[gki (x
k
,uk,θi)]].
(3)
Each player Pi tries to minimize the accumulated cost
starting from any initial stage k0 < K, yet can only change
value of his own control uki ,k = k0, · · · ,K− 1, i.e.,
V
k0
i (l¯
K
i ,x
k0 ,θi) := min
u
k0
i ,··· ,u
K−1
i
J
k0
i (u
k0 , · · · ,uK−1,xk0 ,θi), (4)
which leads to the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(PBNE) in Definition 1. At the equilibrium, every player has
no incentive to change his action, if others’ actions remain
the same.
Definition 1: In the N-person K-stage dynamic game with
the state dynamics in (1), the type belief update in (2),
and the cumulative cost in (3), a sequence of control poli-
cies µ
∗,[k0,K]
i (h
K ,θi) := {µ
∗,k0
i (h
k0 ,θi), · · · ,µ
∗,K
i (h
K ,θi)} ∈
Γ[k0,K] := ∏Kk=k0Ui,∀k0 ∈K , for each player i under a given
information structure {hK ,θi} is called the perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium policy if µ
∗,[k0,K]
i (h
K ,θi),∀h
K , satisfies the
following sets of inequalities, i.e.,
V
k0
i (l¯
K
i ,x
k0 ,θi) = J
k0
i (µ
∗,[k0,K]
i (h
K
,θi),µ
∗,[k0,K]
−i (h
K
,θ−i),x
k0 ,θi)
≤ Jki (u
[k0,K]
i (h
K
,θi),u
∗,[k0,K]
−i (h
K
,θ−i),x
k0 ,θi),
for all µ
[k0,K]
i (h
K ,θi) ∈ Γ
[k0,K],∀i ∈N ,∀θi ∈Θi,∀k0 ∈K .
D. Trajectory-tracking under Linear-quadratic Specification
In the following sections, we consider linear state dy-
namics f (xk,uk1, · · · ,u
k
N ,θ ) := A(θ )x
k + ∑Ni=1Bi(θi)u
k
i with
matrices A(θ ) ∈Rn×n and Bi(θi)∈R
n×mi . The cost matrices
Dki (θi) ∈R
n×n,Fkii (θi) ∈R
mi×mi ,∀i ∈N ,k ∈K , is symmet-
ric and positive semi-definite. The control objective is to
track a time-varying trajectory {xkdi}k∈K with a quadratic
cost penalty that minimizes the state tracking error and the
control effort, i.e., gki (x
k,uk,θi)= (x
k−xkdi)
′Dki (θi)(x
k−xkdi)+
∑Nj=1(u
k
j)
′Fki j(θi)u
k
j,k= k0,k0+1, · · · ,K−1, and the terminal
cost gKi = (x
K− xKdi)
′DKi (θi)(x
K− xKdi). Note that each player
aims to follow a different trajectory xkdi .
III. ANALYTIC RESULTS
We use dynamic programming with the composed state
of belief state l¯ki and the physical state x
k to compute the
PBNE in a backward fashion with the boundary condi-
tion VKi (l¯
K
i ,x
K ,θi) = (x
K − xKdi)
′DKi (θi)(x
K − xKdi). For k =
0,1, · · · ,K− 1, we have the following recurrence form:
V ki (l¯
k
i ,x
k
,θi) =min
uki
{∑
θ−i
lki (θ−i|x
k
,θi)
Ewk∼d
wk
[V k+1i (l¯
k+1
i , f (x
k
,uk,θ )+wk,θi)
+ (xk− xkdi)
′Dki (θi)(x
k− xkdi)+
N
∑
j=1
(ukj)
′Fki j(θi)u
k
j]}.
(5)
According to the inspection of the linear coupling of the be-
lief state as well as the boundary condition quadratic with re-
spect to the physical state, we make the ansatzV ki (l¯
k
i ,x
k,θi)=
(xk)′Ski (l¯
k
i ,θi)x
k +(xk)′Nki (l¯
k
i ,θi)+ q
k
i (l¯
k
i ,θi),∀k ∈ K , where
Ski (l¯
k
i ,θi) ∈ R
n×n is a symmetric and positive semi-definite
matrix for every θi, and N
k
i (l¯
k
i ,θi) ∈ R
n,qki (l¯
k
i ,θi) ∈ R are a
sequence of n-dimension vectors and scalars, respectively.
Let k= K, we have the following boundary conditions.
SKi (l¯
K
i ,θi) = D
K
i (θi),∀l¯
K
i .
NKi (l¯
K
i ,θi) =−2D
K
i (θi)x
K
di
,∀l¯Ki .
qKi (l¯
K
i ,θi) = (x
K
di
)′DKi (θi)x
K
di
,∀l¯Ki .
(6)
Therefore, we rewrite the right hand side of (5) as the
following quadratic form with respect to the state xk and
control uki , i.e.,
∑
θ−i
lki (θ−i|x
k
,θi)[(x
k)′R3,ki (θ )x
k+(uki )
′R
1,k
i (θi)u
k
i
+(xk)′(R2,ki (θ ))
′uki +(u
k
i )
′R
2,k
i (θ )x
k
+(uki )
′R
4,k
i (u
k
−i,θ )+ (x
k)′R5,ki (u
k
−i,θ )+R
6,k
i (u
k
−i,θ )],
(7)
where R
1,k
i (θi) = F
k
ii +B
′
iS
k+1
i Bi ∈ R
mi×mi depends only on
Pi’s own type and is symmetric and positive semi-definite
because Sk+1i and F
k
ii are both symmetric and positive semi-
definite matrices. Similarly,
R
2,k
i (θ ) ∈ R
mi×n := B′iS
k+1
i A.
R
3,k
i (θ ) ∈ R
n×n := Dki +A
′Sk+1i A.
R
4,k
i (u
k
−i,θ ) ∈R
mi := B′iN
k+1
i + 2B
′
iS
k+1
i ∑
j 6=i
B ju
k
j.
R
5,k
i (u
k
−i,θ ) ∈R
n := A′Nk+1i + 2A
′Sk+1i (∑
j 6=i
B ju
k
j)− 2D
k
i x
k
di
.
R
6,k
i (u
k
−i,θ ) ∈R := ∑
j 6=i
(ukj)
′Fki ju
k
j+∑
j 6=i
(B ju
k
j)
′Nk+1i + q
k+1
i +
Tr(Sk+1i Q
k)+ (∑
j 6=i
B ju
k
j)
′Sk+1i (∑
j 6=i
B ju
k
j)+ (x
k
di
)′Dki (x
k
di
).
Since the belief state is linear with respect to the parameter
R
l,k
i , l ∈ {2,3,4,5,6},k∈K , we can define the following to
incorporate the belief state, i.e.,
R¯
l,k
i (u
k
−i,θi) := ∑
θ−i
lki (θ−i|x
k
,θi)R
k
l (u
k
−i,θi,θ−i). (8)
A. PBNE Control Policy
We obtain the PBNE policy in (9) with notations in (8)
via a completion of the square.
u
∗,k
i =−(R
1,k
i (θi))
−1R¯
2,k
i (θi)(x
k+
1
2
R¯
4,k
i (u
∗,k
−i ,θi)). (9)
The PBNE control value of Pi,∀i ∈ N , turns out to be
Markov, i.e., depends on the state xk and type θi. Define
control vectors
uki (x
k) := [µ¯ki (x
k
,θ 1i ), · · · , µ¯
k
i (x
k
,θ
Ni
i )]
′ ∈RmiNi×1.
uk(xk) := [uk1(x
k),uk2(x
k) · · · ,ukN(x
k)]′ ∈ R∑i∈N miNi×1.
and the following block matrices for each stage k ∈K ,
W 0,k = [W 0,ki j ∈ R
miNi×m jN j ]i, j∈N .
W
0,k
i j := [W
0,k
il jh
∈Rmi×mi ]l∈{1,··· ,Ni},h∈{1,··· ,N j}.
W 1,k = [W 1,k1 , · · · ,W
1,k
N ]
′ ∈ R∑i∈N miNi×n.
W 2,k = [W 2,k1 , · · · ,W
2,k
N ]
′ ∈ R∑i∈N miNi×1.
The element matrix W
0,k
i j shows implicitly how Pj’s type-
related control policies affect Pi’s policy under different type
values θi ∈Θi. In particular,W
0,k
il jh
shows the effect of player
i with type value θ li on player j with type value θ
h
j . The
matrix W 0,k has the following two structures.
First, the matrix W 0,k is a block-wise hollow matrix, i.e.,
W
0,k
ii = 0,∀i ∈ N , because the right hand side of (9) only
includes the PBNE policy of other players, i.e., u
∗,k
−i .
Second, the non-diagonal matrix blocks W
0,k
i j :=
TkiL
k
i jB j , i 6= j can be written as the multiplication of
three matrices where B j := Diagonal[B j(θ
1
j ), · · · ,B j(θ
N j
j )]
and Tki := Diagonal[(R
1,k
i (θ
1
i ))
−1B′i(θ
1
i )S
k+1
i (l¯
k+1
i ,θ
1
i ), · · · ,
(R1,ki (θ
Ni
i ))
−1B′i(θ
Ni
i )S
k+1
i (l¯
k+1
i ,θ
Ni
i )] are diagonal. The
belief matrix Lki j contains the Pi’s belief of Pj’s type
θ j ∈Θ j under his type θi ∈Θi, and is a stochastic matrix in
Definition 2.
Lki j :=


lki (θ
1
j |x
k,θ 1i ), · · · l
k
i (θ
N j
j |x
k,θ 1i )
lki (θ
1
j |x
k,θ 2i ), · · · l
k
i (θ
N j
j |x
k,θ 2i )
...
. . .
...
lki (θ
1
j |x
k,θNii ), · · · l
k
i (θ
N j
j |x
k,θNii )


.
Definition 2: A matrix is a stochastic matrix if all its
elements are positive and all the rows sum to one.
Similarly, we have the explicit form of elements of W 1,k
and W 2,k as
W
1,k
i ∈ R
miNi×n :=
[−(R1,ki (θ
1
i ))
−1B′i(θ
1
i )S
k+1
i (l¯
k
i ,θ
1
i )Eθˆ−i∼l¯ki
A(θ 1i ,θ−i), · · · ,
− (R1,ki (θ
Ni
i ))
−1B′i(θ
Ni
i )S
k+1
i (l¯
k
i ,θ
Ni
i )Eθˆ−iA(θ
Ni
i ,θ−i)]
′
.
W
2,k
i ∈ R
miNi×1 := [−
1
2
(R1,ki (θ
1
i ))
−1B′i(θ
1
i )N
k+1
i (l¯
k
i ,θ
1
i ),
· · · ,−
1
2
(R1,ki (θ
Ni
i ))
−1B′i(θ
Ni
i )N
k+1
i (l¯
k
i ,θ
Ni
i )]
′
.
Finally, we can rewrite (9) in the following matrix form.
uk(xk) =W 0,kuk(xk)+W1,kxk+W2,k. (10)
Theorem 1: If matrix (W 1,kxk +W 2,k) is in the column
space of the matrix (I −W 0,k), i.e., matrix (I −W 0,k) is
nonsingular, there exists a unique PBNE control policy for
each player Pi of any types θ
l
i , l = 1,2, · · · ,Ni, which is an
affine state-feedback control, i.e.,
u∗,k(xk) = (I−W0,k)−1[W 1,kxk+W2,k]. (11)
Moreover, the cost parameters Fki j(θi),∀i, j,θi,k do not affect
the PBNE policy u∗,k(xk).
Remark 1: Theorem 1 shows that under the Markov be-
lief assumption Pr(θ−i|h
k
,θi) = Pr(θ−i|x
k
,θi), the feedback
control is also Markov, i.e., the control depends on the
state xk rather than the history hk. Moreover, the PBNE
policy is affine under the linear-quadratic setting. Finally, the
cost parameters Fki j(θi),∀i, j,θi,k, affect only the equilibrium
value yet not the equilibrium policy, which means that con-
sidering others’ payoff and being altruistic do not improve
the equilibrium of any players under any type values.
Proposition 1: The matrix (I −W 0,k) is nonsingular if
there exists an positive integer t (which could be infinity)
such that (W 0,k)t+1 = 0. Moreover, the inverse is St :=
I+W 0,k+(W 0,k)2+ · · ·+(W0,k)t .
Proof: Equivalently, we prove that if (I −W 0,k) is
singular, then (W 0,k)t+1 6= 0 for every positive integer t.
First, if (I−W 0,k) is singular, there exists a nonzero vector
v such that W 0,kv = v, then (W 0,k)tv = v,∀t, which implies
that (W 0,k)t+1 6= 0 for every positive integer t.
Proposition 1 shows necessary conditions for (I−W 0,k)
nonsingular. The matrix W 0,k is called a Nilpotent matrix
if t is finite and a convergent matrix if t goes to infinity.
Proposition 1 is not a sufficient condition because (W 0,k)tv=
v does not lead to W 0,kv= v for a nonzero vector v.
The following Proposition 2 shows the degeneration to
a single player optimal control problem and Proposition 3
investigates the special case of two players N = 2, which the
dimension of the inverse can be reduced by exploiting the
zero elements in the two-by-two block matrix.
Proposition 2: If the matrix A in the state dynamics
depends only on player i’s type and all other N− 1 players
lose control to the system, i.e., B j(θ j) = 0,∀ j ∈ {N \ i},∀θ j.
Then, W 0,k = 0 and the control policy degenerates to the
optimal state-feedback policy of a single person.
Proposition 3: For N = 2, define matrix Y := I −
W
0,k
21 W
0,k
12 ∈ R
m2N2×m2N2 . If Y is nonsingular, there exists a
unique PBNE control under state xk, i.e.,
u
∗,k
1 (x
k) = [W 1,k1 +W
0,k
12 Y
−1(W 0,k21 W
1,k
1 +W
1,k
2 )]x
k+W2,k1 .
u
∗,k
2 (x
k) = [Y−1(W 0,k21 W
1,k
1 +W
1,k
2 )]x
k+W2,k2 .
A necessary condition of Y nonsingular is the determinant
of ∏i∈{1,2}∏θi∈Θi−(R
1,k
i (θi))
−1B′iS
k+1
i Bi less than 1.
Proof: We use the following three facts. First, if
the absolute values of all eigenvalues are less than one,
the matrix is a convergent matrix. Then we can apply
Proposition 1 to show the existence of the inverse. Second,
the determinant of a matrix is equal to the product of its
eigenvalues and the determinant of the matrix product is
equal to the product of the determinants. Third, by Perron-
Frobenius theorem, the largest eigenvalue of a stochastic
matrix is 1. Also, the eigenvalues of a diagonal matrix are
the diagonal elements. Thus, we require the absolute values
of all eigenvalues of W
0,k
21 W
0,k
12 less than 1 as a necessary
condition. Since stochastic matrices Lk12 and L
k
21’s eigenvalue
cannot be greater than 1, we only need the eigenvalue of the
rest diagonal matrices less than 1.
Note that matrix Y is of a smaller dimension than (I−
W 0,k), thus simplifies the matrix inverse. Moreover, we can
change the sequence of the control vector, i.e., u˜k = [uk2,u
k
1]
and obtain Y˜ = I−W 0,k12 W
0,k
21 ∈ R
m1N1×m1N1 . Thus, we can
choose either Y or Y˜ to obtain a lower dimension between
miNi, i ∈ {1,2}.
B. Time Consistency
Let us denote HN(Γ; [0,K];sol) as the N-person K-stage
dynamic game with the product strategy space Γ, the initial
stage k0 = 0, and the solution concept sol, e.g., PBNE.
Further, let γ [k1,k2] ∈ Γ[k1,k2] be the truncation of γ ∈ Γ to
the stage interval of [k1,k2]⊂ [0,K].
H
[k1,k2]
N,β := HN({γ ∈ Γ : γ
[0,k1−1] = β [0,k1−1],
γ [k2+1,K] = β [k2+1,K],γ [k1,k2] ∈ Γ[k1,k2]}; [0,K];sol)
(12)
denotes a version of HN(Γ; [0,K];sol) where the policies of
all players in the stage interval [0,k1−1] and [k2+1,K] are
fixed as β . Then, we have the following Definition 3 and
4 for weakly time consistent and strongly time consistent,
respectively, which leads to Theorem 2.
Definition 3: An N-tuple of policies γ∗ ∈ Γ solving the
dynamic game HN(Γ; [0,K];sol) under the solution concept
sol is weakly time consistent (WTC) if its truncation γ∗,[k0,K]
solves the truncated game H
[k0,K]
N,γ∗ for all k0 ∈ [1,K]. If a
solution γ∗ ∈ Γ is not WTC, then it is time inconsistent.
Definition 4: An N-tuple of policies γ∗ ∈ Γ solving the
dynamic game HN(Γ; [0,K];sol) under the solution con-
cept sol is strongly time consistent (STC) if its truncation
γ∗,[k0,K] solves the truncated game H
[k0,K]
N,β for all β
[0,k0−1] ∈
Γ[0,k0−1],∀k0 ∈ [1,K].
The WTC property states that the policy is consistent on
the equilibrium state trajectory. The STC property further
guarantees that the policy is consistent for all potential
equilibrium state trajectories, i.e., if players take actions that
deviate from the optimal trajectory due to perturbations or
trembling hands, the STC policy yields an equilibrium tra-
jectory for the game that starts from the perturbed composed
state.
Theorem 2: The PBNE policy (11) is strongly time con-
sistent.
The proof follows directly from the definition of PBNE in
Definition 1 and the fact that dynamic programming principle
is used to obtain (5) with the composed state (l¯ki ,x
k). In
Definition (1), the sets of inequalities is true for all stage
k0 ∈K as the initial stage, all possible state realizations h
K ,
and belief states l¯ki . If we revise the Definition 1 to be only
true for k0 = 0 and the equilibrium state history, then the
resulted policy degenerates to be WTC.
C. Generalized Riccati Equation
We obtain the following set of generalized Riccati equa-
tions with boundary conditions in (6) via plugging the PBNE
policy (11) into (5) and match the coefficient of the quadratic,
linear, and constant terms, respectively. Let us denote matrix
Mkjl ∈ R
m j×∑ j¯∈N m j¯N j¯ , l ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N j}, j ∈ N ,k ∈ K as
the (l +∑
j−1
j¯=1
N j¯)
th row block of the matrix (I −W 0,k)−1,
which corresponds to the lth type of player j at stage
k. Then µ¯kj (x
k,θ lj) = M
k
jlW
1,kxk +MkjlW
2,k ∈ Rm j followed
from (11). Define Gki := I− (B
′
iS
k+1
i )
′(R1,ki )
−1B′i, then for all
l ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N j}, j ∈N ,k ∈K , the quadratic term leads to
Ski (l¯
k
i ,θi) = Eθˆ−i∼l¯ki
[2A′Gki S
k+1
i (∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
1,k)
+A′Gki S
k+1
i A+∑
j 6=i
(MkjlW
1,k)′Fki jM
k
jlW
1,k+Dki
+(∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
1,k)′Gki S
k+1
i (∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
1,k)].
(13)
The linear term leads to
Nki (l¯
k
i ,θi) = Eθˆ−i∼l¯ki
[2A′Gki S
k+1
i (∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
2,k)
+∑
j 6=i
2(MkjlW
1,k)′Fki jM
k
jlW
2,k− 2Dki x
k
di
+(∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
1,k)′GkiN
k+1
i +A
′GkiN
k+1
i
+ 2(∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
1,k)′Gki S
k+1
i (∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
2,k)].
(14)
The constant term leads to
qki (l¯
k
i ,θi) = Tr(S
k+1
i Q
k)+ qk+1i +(x
k
di
)′Dki (x
k
di
)+
Eθˆ−i∼l¯ki
[∑
j 6=i
(MkjlW
2,k)′Fki jM
k
jlW
2,k
+(∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
2,k)′GkiN
k+1
i
− (B′iN
k+1
i )
′ (R
k
1(θi))
−1
4
B′iN
k+1
i
+(∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
2,k)′Gki S
k+1
i (∑
j 6=i
B j(θ
l
j)M
k
jlW
2,k)].
(15)
Remark 2: If the realization of the type becomes public
under a complete information game, then l¯ki would be 1 for
the real type and 0 for all other possible realizations, which
degenerates (13), (14), (15) to the regular Riccati equations
of N-person games.
Finally, we summarize the results in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: For an N-person K-stage linear-quadratic
game specified in Section II-D, let there exist a set of matrix
valued functions {Ski ,N
k
i ,q
k
i },∀i∈N ,∀k ∈K satisfying the
generalized discrete-time Riccati equations (13), (14), (15)
with boundary conditions in (6). Then, for all non-singular
matrix (I−W 0,k), there exists a unique PBNE policy (11)
as an affine state-feedback control law. The corresponding
value function V
k0
i (l¯
k
i ,x
k0 ,θi) in (4) for each player i is
R¯
6,k
i (u
∗,k
−i ,θi)+ (x
k)′(R¯3,ki (θi)− (R¯
2,k
i (θi))
′(R1,ki (θi))
−1R¯
2,k
i (θi))x
k
+(xk)′(R¯5,ki (u
∗,k
−i ,θi)− (R¯
2,k
i (θi))
′(R1,ki (θi))
−1R¯
4,k
i (u
∗,k
−i ,θi))
−
1
4
((R1,ki (θi))
−1R¯
4,k
i (u
∗,k
−i ,θi))
′R
1,k
i (θi)((R
1,k
i (θi))
−1R¯
4,k
i (u
∗,k
−i ,θi)),
where u
∗,k
−i is the PBNE policies of all players except i.
The bottleneck to compute the PBNE policy and the gen-
eralized Riccati equations is the coupling in type estimation
and the control input, i.e., the separation principle does not
hold. First, if the belief state l¯ki is known, each player can
compute (13), (14), (15) from the terminal stage to the initial
stage. However, the type learning in (2) depends on the
PBNE policy in (11) and updates forwardly from the initial
stage to the terminal stage. Thus, we need to find a consistent
sequence of beliefs and control policies to satisfy the two
boundary conditions of the last stage SKi as well as the initial
belief l¯0i . In Section IV, we iterate the forward and backward
equations numerically until they converge to the consistent
pair of the belief and the control, if the consistent pair exists.
Once the belief of the type value converges to 0 or 1, the
belief will remain the same according to the Bayesian update
in (2).
IV. CASE STUDY
In the case study, we consider a scalar system xk ∈ R
whose state dynamics are affected by two distributed players
P1,P2, who share a common control objective to track a
signal but they are unaware of the other players’ types. Each
player can be either of a skilled or unskilled type, which is
privately known to the player himself, and we use a binary
random variable θˆi to denote the type. In particular, θ1 ∈
Θ1 := {θ
H
1 ,θ
L
1 } and θ2 ∈Θ2 := {θ
g
2 ,θ
b
2 }. When both players
are skilled, the system parameter AHg := A(θH1 ,θ
g
2 ) = 0.1.
If only one of them is skilled, then AHg < ALg = AHb < 1.
If none of them is skilled, the system becomes unstable
ALb = 1.1. The highly skilled player controls the system with
more ease, and therefore we let BH1 :=B1(θ
H
1 ) = 1>B
L
1 = 0.2
and B
g
2 = 1>B
b
2 = 0.2. Suppose that both players aim to track
the sinusoidal signal wkd := w
k
di
= 10sin(0.05k),k ∈K .
A. Belief Convergence
Consider the setting where two players have the same
cost parameters, then the behaviors of two players become
indistinguishable. First, all beliefs lki (θ−i|x
k,θi),∀i ∈ {1,2},
converge to the right type value as shown in Fig. 1. After 30
steps, the belief of the unskilled player in blue converges,
while the belief of the skilled player does not converge
until 60 steps shown in two red lines. The blue lines
converge faster because it is easier for an unskilled player to
distinguish ALg from ALb which results in an unstable system.
On the other hand, the highly skilled player has to distinguish
between AHg and AHb which both result in a stable system.
The convergence rate of the belief depends on the dis-
tinguishability of different types. For example, in Fig. 2, a
highly skilled player can better learn the type of the other
player if the value difference of AHg and AHb is larger.
Similarly, the convergence rate increases under a closer
initial guess l¯0i as shown in Fig. 3, a more substantial value
difference in B under two type values, or a smaller variance
of the noise sequence wk.
B. PBNE Control Policy
We plot the control value and state in Fig. 4 under the
type pair (θH1 ,θ
b
2 ) and Fig. 5 under (θ
l
1,θ
b
2 ). Two plots show
that two players with private type values can cooperate to
track the reference signal. If no controls are applied, the
system state xko will either not tracking the reference under
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Fig. 1. All beliefs lki (θ−i|x
k ,θi),∀i ∈ {1,2}, converge to the right type
value. Two blue lines indicate a faster convergence rate than two red lines
because it is easier for a player to distinguish between a stable and an
unstable system than between two stable systems with different values of
A.
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Fig. 2. The belief lk1(θ
b
2 |x
k ,θH1 ),k ∈ K under three different values of
AHb. The larger difference between AHg and AHb increases the convergence
rate. The belief hardly converges when the difference is not sufficiently large
as shown in red.
the stable A as shown in Fig. 4, or diverge quickly under
the unstable A in Fig. 5. It shows that the more capable
player spends more control effort and a higher cost in the
cooperation as shown in Fig. 4. A higher cumulative cost
V 01 (x
0,θH1 ) = 911>V
0
2 (x
0,θ b1 ) = 526 is observed for player
1. However, if both players are unskilled, then both of them
have to spend more control efforts but achieve worse tracking
results as shown in Fig. 5. Their equilibrium controls also
bear a much higher cumulative cost for each player, e.g.,
V 01 (x
0,θL1 ) =V
0
2 (x
0,θ b1 ) = 8016.
C. Asymmetric Information and Deception
Finally, we investigate the effect of the asymmetric in-
formation and compare it to the following two complete
information structures. First, if both players’ true type values
are revealed at the initial stage, it degenerates to a classical
linear quadratic game which shares the same results of PBNE
and state tracking in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 after the belief
converges. Second, if the first skilled player θH1 deceives
the second unskilled player θ b2 to believe that he is actually
unskilled, i.e., l02(θ
L
1 |x
0
,θ b2 ) = 1, then the second unskilled
player has to spend more efforts as shown in 6. However,
the deception brings in a degeneration of the state tracking,
thus increasing the cost of both players to 2753 and 2808,
respectively. Therefore, although being skilled leads to more
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Fig. 3. The belief lk1(θ
b
2 |x
k ,θH1 ),k ∈K , converges under three different
values of the initial belief l01 (θ
b
2 |x
0,θH1 ). An initial belief closer to the right
type value increases the convergence rate.
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Fig. 4. The black dotted line shows the sinusoidal signal xkd as the reference
and the proposed feedback control pair (uk1,u
k
2) aims to track the reference
in the green dotted line. The blue and magenta lines represent the control
value of player 1 and 2, respectively, and show that a skilled player spends
more efforts.
control efforts, player 1 cannot gain by deceiving the other
player.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work investigates the linear quadratic game under
an asymmetric information structure where each player pos-
sesses private information known as the type. The solution
concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) cou-
ples the forward belief dynamics and the backward dynamic
programming equations of the players. We have provided
a set of generalized Riccati equations for the N-person
asymmetric information linear quadratic game and shown
that the equilibrium policy takes an affine state-feedback
form. The equilibrium control law is shown to be strongly
time consistent and the separation principle does not hold for
asymmetric information games. A case study has shown that
the belief dynamics converge to the true type and the players
can achieve the objective of tracking a sinusoidal reference
signal under PBNE.
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